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NOTES AND COMMENT
other enterprises entails the keeping of numerous books and records
essential to its conduct or useful in its efficient operation . . . The
engineer's statement which was held inadmissible in this case falls
into quite a different category. It's not a record made for the system-
atic conduct of the business as a business." In brief, the Court ruled
that, within the contemplation of the statute, the business of a rail-
road is railroading and not causing accidents. The decision of the
Court is sound in principle for it is a reaffirmance of the Common-
wealth Fund proposal. As Professor Maguire stated in a note in
the Harvard Law Review,21 "The majority opinion in the Hoffman
case quite correctly emphasizes the morbid judicial fear of deliberate
falsification expressed by the early English formulations of the hear-
say rule and its exceptions. Correctly again, the opinion speaks of
the judicial effort to indicate guaranties of trustworthiness connected
with the documents admitted as business entries.. ."
FLORENCE BECKER,
HAROLD F. McNIECE.
TAX AVOIDANCE BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Tax avoidance, customarily associated with private firms and
individuals, is applied on by far the largest scale of all-by our own
Federal Government. This is not to imply, however, that the Gov-
ernment has thereby breached any ethical standards, for it is now
well recognized that despite the evils which result from the promis-
cuous application of dubious tax reduction practices, the use of sound
legal principles for reducing taxes is "above reproach" 1 and not even
"mildly unethical". 2
Since 1819, when Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Mary-
land 3 expounded the principle that the Constitution of the United
States implies that properties, functions, and instrumentalities of the
Federal Government are immune from taxation by its constituent
parts, the Government has attempted to obtain the maximum pos-
sible exemption from all state and local taxes.
However, although the doctrine of implied immunity appeared
to be clear when applied to direct taxes levied on the Government,
its precise reach became obscure when applied to indirect taxes.
21 (1942) 56 HARV. L. REv. 464.
'See PAUL, STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATION (1937) 85.2 Rands, Inc., 34 B. T. A. 1094.
3 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
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Perhaps the most perplexing problem with respect to the ex-
tent of the Federal Government's immunity arose in connection with
private contractors performing work for the Government. The prob-
lem came to a climax with the advent of World War II. As a
result of the critical emergency, the Government entered into an un-
precedented number of cost type contracts designed to expedite the
production of war material. Under this type of contract, the Gov-
ernment obligated itself to reimburse the contractor for all proper
costs incurred in performing the contract, plus a profit. Almost
immediately thereafter, many state tax authorites in States which
impose sales, use, occupational, privilege, and gasoline taxes applied
those taxes to cost type contractors and demanded payment thereof.
This situation brought to the fore the question of whether the
Government's exemption from taxes could be applied to cost type
contractors, on the theory that a tax levied on the contractor would,
in turn, increase the cost to the Government in like amount.
The War and Navy Departments were seriously concerned with
the prospect of greatly increased costs to the war program as a re-
sult of the action taken by the States. In the belief that state sales,
use, privilege, occupational, gasoline and similar taxes were inappli-
cable to cost type contractors with the United States, the War and
Navy Departments requested the Attorney General of the United
States to undertake resistance to such taxes for and on behalf of
the War and Navy Departments.4
Thereupon, arrangements were consummated with a co-oper-
ative vendor of a Government cost type contractor for the use of the
vendor's litigating position with reference to the sales tax. The issue
was thereby presented to the Supreme Court of Alabama in the case
of King & Boozer v. Alabama.5 The Alabama court held that the
State had no authority to levy a sales tax on purchases of a Govern-
ment cost type contractor and stated, "The contractor here was
acting for the Government in the accomplishment of a governmental
purpose... The conclusion is inescapable that the burden of the tax
in the instant case falls directly and immediately upon the Govern-
ment. The addition of the tax raises the cost of construction which
the Government is bound to pay."
On appeal, however, the decree of the state court was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Alabama v. King & Boozer.6
In upholding the validity of the state sales tax on purchases made
by a cost type contractor, the Court rejected the contention that the
contractor was so acting as to place the Government in the role of
a purchaser of the material necessary for the performance of tlie
contract. The legal effect of the transaction, the Court concluded,
was to obligate the contractor for the purchases inasmuch as the
contract contemplated that the contractor was to purchase all the
422 Comp. GEN. (1942) 109, 112.
5 241 Ala. 557, 3 So. (2d) 572 (1941).
6314 U. S. 1, 86 L. ed. 3 (1941).
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materials required in its own name and on its own credit.
Faced by the prospect of a large increase in the cost of the war
program, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision, the Govern-
ment made extensive studies of the various state and local tax regu-
lations to determine methods for avoiding such taxes. The results
of these carefully developed methods, which have proved so success-
ful in reducing the cost of the war program, are worthy of careful
analysis as a guide for tax savings by private individuals and con-
cerns.
An interesting example is afforded by the practice developed
by the Federal Government for avoiding the New York City Sales
Tax and similar taxes levied by other localities. The Government
had 'many cost type contracts in process for the repair of vessels,
under which, the contractor purchased all the required material and
employed all the necessary labor on its own account. The resulting
costs were reimbursed to the contractor by the Government.
The Comptroller of the City of New York ruled that all pur-
chases of tangible personal property by a contractor for use in con-
nection with ship repairs are at retail 7 and therefore subject to the
sales tax. The conclusion was based on the theory that:
1. ship repair and alteration contractors are engaged primarily
in the business of rendering services,
2. the use of tangible personal property is only incidental in
the rendering of such services, and
3. reimbursement by the Government to the contractor is made
for the aggregate cost of the services and material, and often
after the incorporation of the material into the work.
As a result of the Comptroller's decision, the sales tax was
levied on all purchases of tangible personal property by ship repair
contractors, thus increasing the cost of the material to the contractor,
and in turn, the Government.
To avoid this situation, the Government developed a new form
of ship repair contract to take advantage of the fact that a sale is
defined by the New York City Sales Tax Law as "Any transfer
of title or possession or both . . . in any manner or by any means
whatsoever for a consideration, or any agreement therefor . . .
Since, under this definition, a sale may be consummated by any
agreement for the transfer of title or possession,9 the new form of
7 Article 41a of the Regulations of the Comptroller of the City of New
York under the New York City Sales and Compensating Use Tax Laws Per-
taining to War Contracts, Nov. 25, 1942.
8 Section N41-1.0, Local Law 18 of 1943.
9The first section of the Uniform Sales Act (Personal Property Law of
New York § 82) defines a sale as follows: "A sale is an agreement whereby
the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration
called the price."
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ship repair contract 10 was prepared so as to contain the following
provisions:
Title to all material and equipment to be incorporated in the vessel or its
equipment or to be used in doing any work hereunder or in connection there-
with shall vest in the Government as payment is made therefor by the Govern-
ment or by the Contractor, or upon delivery thereof to the Government or to
the Contractor, whichever of said events shall first occur.
The Contractor shall, as soon as practicable, identify any property which
is to become a part of the vessel by marking or segregation in such a way as
to indicate ownership thereof by the Government and its allocation to the vessel.
The effect of these provisions was to render all purchases by
ship repair contractors non-taxable by the simple legal expedient of
transferring title (thus creating a resale to the Government which
is tax immune) prior to the incorporation of the material in the
work. The results were so successful that all outstanding ship re-
pair contracts were cancelled and renegotiated in the new form.
The proper control of the date of vesting title was also used
to great advantage by the Government in avoiding real estate taxes.
At the start of the present emergency, the Government let out
numerous contracts for the construction of facilities, required for
the production of war material. The contracts provided that the
contractors were to construct the facilities on their own account and
would be reimbursed by the Government for the costs thereof over
a period of sixty consecutive calendar months beginning at the time
the facilities were completed. The title to all such facilities vested
in the contractor until the final payment and completion of the con-
tract, at which time, title would pass to the Government (unless the
contractor elected to purchase the facilities).
Under this form of contract, the contractor was subjected to
real estate taxes based on the value of the facilities. The cost of
such taxes were, in turn, included in the contractor's statement of
costs and subsequently reimbursed by the Government; thus, the
ultimate cost of the tax was borne by the Government.
To avoid this situation, the Government developed a revised
form of facilities contract providing, in part, that:
Title to any and all facilities shall at no time be in the Contractor but shall
pass directly from the vendor of such facilities to the Government upon any
payments made on account thereof either by the Government or by the Con-
tractor, upon the delivery of such facilities to the Contractor on account of
the Government or upon the happening of any event upon the occurrence of
which the title passes out of the vendor.
This effort on the part of the Government to avoid real estate
taxes on facilities used by its contractors was vigorously resisted
by local taxing authorities. It was contended that increased muni-
cipal services, to serve and protect the influx of war workers, are
10 Navy Department, Bureau of Ships' NObs Contract for the Repair or
Alteration of Vessels (Revised April 19, 1943).
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required in all communities where large war contracts are placed;
that such local services rely heavily on real estate taxation; that
to exclude property acquired by the Government imposes the in-
creased cost on others. While it was conceded that the allowance
of assessments on such property would measurably increase the cost
of waging the war, it was argued that the Federal Government may
diffuse the cost throughout the country instead of putting a back-
breaking burden on local governments where war plants are located-
In the case of United States et al. v. Allegheny County, Pa. 1
the controversy flared when the assessing authorities of Allegheny
County revised a Government contractor's previously determined
assessment for ad valorem taxes by adding thereto the value of
machinery which the War Department leased to the contractor in
order to facilitate the production of greater quantities of large field
guns.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled 12 that under the state
law regardless of who held the title to it the machinery constituted
a part of the mill for purposes of assessment and was properly taxed
as real estate. It acknowledged. that property in the physical pos-
session of the United States is not taxable, but this assessment, it
said, is not against the United States but against the contractor,
which is operating its mill for private purposes. The Court reasoned
that if the contractor defaulted in tax payments, "the paramount
rights of the government in the machinery could not be divested or
in any way affected," hence the Government could suffer no loss.
Evidence that the machinery was not owned by the contractor was,
therefore, held to be irrelevant and improperly admitted.
The United States Supreme Court reversed this judgment,
holding 13 that the Tax Law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
as applied in this case violates the Federal Constitution in so far as
it purports to authorize taxation of the property interests of the
United States in the machinery in the contractor's plant. The Court
stated :
We think, however, that the Government's property interests are not taxable
either to it or its bailee. The "Government" is an abstraction, and its posses-
sion of property largely constructive. Actual possession and custody of Gov-
ernment property nearly always are in someone who is not himself the Govern-
ment but acts in its behalf and for its purposes. He may be an officer, an
agent, or a contractor. His personal advantages from the relationship by way
of salary, profit, or beneficial personal use of the property may be taxed as we
have held. But neither he nor the Government may be taxed for the Govern-
ment's property interest.
The issue is not completely decided as yet, however, for the
Government having won this case may attempt, after the present
11322 U. S. 174. 64 Sup. Ct. 908 (1944).
12 Appeal of Mesta Machine Co., 347 Pa. 191, 32 A. (2d) 236 (1943).
'3 United States et al. v. Allegheny County, Pa., 322 U. S. 174, 64 Sup. Ct.
908 (1944).
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emergency, to extend its immunity to property in which it has an
undivided equitable interest. That is, property in which the title
vests in a third party but which is partly paid for by the Government,
as in the case of 60 Payment Facility Contracts previously discussed.
Thus, it is interesting to observe that the field of tax avoidance
is one in which the Federal Government plays a dual role; as tax
collector it seeks to extend the scope of its taxes and block all
possible loopholes; as a participant in commercial and industrial
activities, it musters every legal expedient in an effort to avoid taxes.
RAPHAEL J. Musicus.
EQUITABLE RELIEF FROM NEGLIGENT STATEMENTS AND
MISREPRESENTATIONS
The traditional doctrine of the law of torts requires one who
undertakes to do a thing, even though gratuitously, to act with care
if he acts at all. However, this rule is greatly modified when the
act is in the form of the spoken or written word rather than in the
form of a physical act. In such case the principle has been that
"negligent words are not actionable unless they are uttered directly,
with knowledge or notice that they will be acted on, to one to whom
the speaker is bound by some relation of duty, arising out of public
calling, contract or otherwise, to act with care if he acts at all." 1
Liability for misrepresentation is similarly restricted to instances in-
volving a breach of duty.
While it is true that an action will lie for slander or libel, there
is a broad field between the truth in a particular case and libel or
slander. Many have entered this field, or found themselves in it,
only to discover that damnum absque injuria is more than a Latin
phrase. The fact that the interests of the public are injured by mis-
representations or negligent statements or that the untruth results in
a public nuisance appears to be of no concern to a court of equity.
In 1830 the courts of this state set down, and have since quite
rigidly followed, the rule that "when the words are spoken, not of
the trader or manufacturer, but of the quality of the articles he makes
or deals in, to render them actionable per se, they must import that
the plaintiff is guilty of deceit or malpractice in making or vending
them." 2 In the absence of such a libel or slander impeaching the
integrity, knowledge, skill, diligence or credit of the plaintiff, the
words are not actionable unless special damage be alleged and proved,
2 Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & S. B. Co., 245 N. Y. 377, 157 N. E.
272 (1927).2 Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537 (N. Y. 1830).
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